A Survey of Residual Cancer Risks Permitted by Health, Safety and Environmental Policy by Sadowitz, March & Graham, John D.
RISK: Health, Safety & Environment (1990-2002)
Volume 6 | Number 1 Article 4
January 1995
A Survey of Residual Cancer Risks Permitted by
Health, Safety and Environmental Policy
March Sadowitz
John D. Graham
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.unh.edu/risk
Part of the Law Commons, Life Sciences Commons, Physical Sciences and Mathematics
Commons, and the Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of New Hampshire – School of Law at University of New Hampshire Scholars'
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in RISK: Health, Safety & Environment (1990-2002) by an authorized editor of University of New
Hampshire Scholars' Repository. For more information, please contact ellen.phillips@law.unh.edu.
Repository Citation
March Sadowitz & John D. Graham, A Survey of Residual Cancer Risks Permitted by Health, Safety and Environmental Policy, 6 RISK 17
(1995).
A Survey of Residual Cancer Risks Permitted
by Health, Safety and Environmental Policy
March Sadowitz & John D. Graham*
Introduction
The analytic tools of risk assessment are designed to determine how
much risk to human health might be caused by various exposures to
chemicals and agents such as radiation. Once risk levels are estimated,
risk management is the process of determining whether risks should be
controlled by standards, including how much, if any, risk should be
allowed. Risks permitted by standards are sometimes called "residual
risks" because they represent the levels of risk that may persist after
100% compliance with standards is achieved.
This paper describes residual cancer risks permitted in the U.S.,
focusing on numerical levels authorized specifically by statute or
regulation under various national and state policies. It also identifies
residual risks permitted only implicitly. Finally, for areas where change
is on the horizon, it discusses potential new policies. Although we do
not predict what new law and regulation will provide, we consider the
possibilities and suggest general policy guidelines.
Earlier surveys of risk management decisions have been published.
One examined cost-effectiveness in risk management, finding risks of 1
in 1,000 to be fairly consistently regulated. Yet, it found several factors
other than magnitude, e.g., population size and cost of control, to play
varying roles in regulating smaller risks.1 Another examined cancer
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Mellon University.
1 C.C. Travis et. al., Cancer Risk Management, 21 Env'I Sci. & Tech. 415 (1987).
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risk management in three regulatory agencies and found no uniformity
on the level of risk considered insignificant.2 Almost eight years later,
such differences continue among and within agencies.
The legal and policy communities use various phrases to describe
the regulatory status of cancer risks. If a risk is deemed "significant" or
"unacceptable," risk managers are generally expected to take steps to
reduce or eliminate it. A "de minimis" or "negligible" risk is one that
can be ignored. If a risk is judged to be insignificant or acceptable,
however, it is not necessarily de minimis or negligible. Cancer risks too
small to exceed the "significance" threshold but too large to fall below
the "de minimis" threshold have a discretionary status in the U.S.
Allowability is determined by considerations such as the weight of the
scientific evidence, the feasibility and affordability of control, the size
of the population at risk and the cost-effectiveness of control.
Quantitative risk assessments were first used by agencies to allocate
resources among an array of health and environmental problems. Since
then, several federal cases challenged its use, but debate may now be
coming full circle. Congress and state legislatures no longer include
only narrative directions for risk management but increasingly add
numerical values to risk standards and directions for calculating them.
Standards for Radiation Protection
In the U.S., cancer risk management was first used for radiation.
One of the earliest and most famous was in the 1975 "Rasmussen
Report" on the public health risks of a nuclear reactor accident.3 U.S.
policy makers still struggle with how much cancer risk should be
tolerated from various man-made sources of radiation.
The International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP)
currently recommends limiting excess environmental radiation to a
total of 100 mrem per year. If continued over a lifetime, 100 mrem per
2 Joseph V. Rodricks et. al., Significant Risk Decisions in Federal Regulatory
Agencies, 7 Regul. Tox. & Pharmacology 317 (1987).
3 Reactor Safety Study: An Assessment of Accident Risks in U.S. Nuclear Power
Plants (1975).
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year produces a dose of about 7 rems. Using the radiation cancer risk
coefficient of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 7 rems
poses an incremental lifetime cancer risk of about 3 in 1,000.4 Besides
the 100 mrem guideline, ICRP calls for exposures to be kept as low as
reasonably achievable (ALARA) and recommends that technologies
causing exposure have a net positive benefit, taking into account
economic and social factors. 5
In 1986 the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) adopted a
variety of qualitative and quantitative safety goals for the operation of
nuclear power plants. 6 For example, the risk of latent cancer fatalities
from living within 10 mi of such plants should not exceed 0.1% of the
sum of cancer fatality risks resulting from all other causes. According to
NRC calculations, this translates into an allowable cancer risk of about
2 in IM per year (or about 1.4 in 10,000 per lifetime).
In 1990, the NRC attempted unsuccessfully to promulgate a policy
statement on the amounts of public risk from various nuclear-related
activities that would be considered "below regulatory concern"
(BRC). 7 Thus, for decommissioned facilities or sites, NRC proposed
to use 10 mrem per year for limiting residual radiation doses.
According to NRC, this proposed standard corresponded to an annual
cancer risk of about 5 in 1M (or about 3.5 in 10,000 in a lifetime).8 It
was never adopted because of public objections.
The cancer risks allowed by NRC's current policies vary
considerably. For example, the NRC's criteria for protection of the
general population from releases of radioactivity from a low-level waste
disposal site includes an annual dose limit of about 25 mrem to the
whole body. According to NRC calculations, this corresponds to an
4 Stephen L. Brown, Harmonizing Chemical and Radiation Risk Management, 26
Env'l Sci. & Tech. 2336 (1992).
5 Radiation Protection: 1990 Recommendations of the ICRP (1990).
6 Safety Goals for the Operation of Nuclear Power Plants: Policy Statement, 51
F.R. 28,044 (1986).
7 Below Regulatory Concern; Policy Statement, 55 F.R. 27,522 (1990).
8 Statement by Forrest J. Remick, Commissioner, NRC, Regulatory Risk
Coherence, American Nuclear Society Topical Meeting on "Risk Management:
Expanding Horizons," Boston, MA, June 8, 1992.
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annual cancer risk of about 1.25 in 100,000 (or about 8.75 per 10,000 in
a lifetime). Yet NRC's newest rules limiting doses of ionizing radiation
(from routine plant operation) to the general public permit an annual
cancer risk of 5 in 100,000 (or about 3.5 per 1,000 in a lifetime). For
nuclear power plant workers, NRC rules permit an annual total effective
dose of about 5 rem, which corresponds to an annual risk of about 2.5
in 1,000. The corresponding lifetime risk is well above 1 in 100,
although general plant practices typically provide workers much more
protection than is prescribed by NRC.9
Because EPA also regulates radiation releases in a variety of
contexts, NRC and EPA conducted a harmonization effort on risk
assessment and management. They found that NRC's approach to
cancer risk management is different from EPA's. The differences in
technical approaches appeared to be less important than those in risk-
management goals. EPA is inclined to set highly ambitious risk limits
(with little regard for cost and practicality) but then permit variances or
exemptions on a case-by-case basis. NRC is inclined to set pragmatic
risk limits while requiring plants to go beyond these limits as cost,
technology and practicality permit. In May 1993 NRC issued the
following statement in conjunction with EPA:10
Although the practical effect of these two regulatory
approaches is largely the same, there remains a difference of
about a factor of ten between NRC's acceptable lifetime risk
level of excess cancer (1 in 1,000), as embodied in the public
dose limit.., and EPA's acceptable lifetime risk range (1 in
10,000 to 1 in 1,000,000) for Hazardous Air Pollutants and
in the Superfund Program. It is this fundamental difference
in acceptable risk and regulatory approaches that the
agencies need to explore in seeking harmony in public and
environmental protection.
EPA recently issued a final rule for radiation-protection standards
for the management and disposal of spent nuclear fuel, and of high-
9 Id.
10 Memorandum from James M. Taylor to the NRC Commissioners, Status of Risk
Harmonization with the Environmental Protection Agency under the 1992
Memorandum of Understanding, May 14, 1993, at 7.
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level and transuranic radioactive wastes. 1 The new rule changes the
calculation of dose from a whole body/specific organ dose to a
committed effective dose (CED), which is the risk-weighted sum of
the dose to each organ. EPA chose a 15 mrem/yr standard which
corresponds to a 5 in 10,000 lifetime risk. It acknowledges that this
seems higher than other programs, but programs such as Superfund and
air toxics use single pathway, single medium exposures while the CED
uses a total body exposure. EPA anticipates that a very small number of
people will actually be exposed at the maximum allowable risk.
Radon is handled differently. First addressed by federal legislation
in 1988, EPA has since used a lifetime cancer risk of 1 in 100 as the
recommended action level. This is not a strict requirement. 12 A new
proposal would require property sales disclosures. It would also require
EPA to establish standards and radon priority areas if there is:13
a reasonable likelihood that the average indoor radon level in
the area is likely to exceed the national average indoor radon
level by more than a de minimis amount.
Standards for Carcinogens in the Food Supply
Beginning in the 1930's, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
approved tolerances for food additives that met a standard of
"reasonable certainty of no harm when used as intended." Later, the
famous Delaney Clause governing carcinogenic food additives (1958),
color additives (1960) and animal drugs (1968) 14 provided that no
additive or animal drug shall be deemed safe if found, after appropriate
tests, to induce cancer in man or animal.
The plain meaning of the Delaney Clause would seem to require
zero cancer risk from additives. However, the 1968 law contained a
statutory exception called the "DES proviso." Diethylstilbestrol (DES),
11 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Environmental Radiation
Protection Standards for the Management and Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-
Level and Transuranic Radioactive Wastes, 58 F.R. 66,398 (1993).
12 Kenneth L. Mossman & Marissa A. Sollitto, Regulatory Control of Indoor Rn,
60 Health Physics 169 (1991).
13 S. 657, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
14 Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act § 409, 21 U.S.C. § 348(c) (1988).
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a drug used to prevent miscarriages in livestock, left a residue in meat.
The DES proviso authorized FDA to approve carcinogenic animal
drugs or additives in animal feed, provided that "no residue" of the
drug or additive will be found in meat or meat products by an
analytical method prescribed by FDA. The first recorded use of
carcinogen risk assessment in the U.S. occurred when FDA defined an
amount of carcinogenic residue in meat that was so tiny that it could be
considered "no residue" under the DES proviso. 15
When developing this so-called "sensitivity of method" (SOM)
procedure, FDA in 1973 rejected reliance on the limits of analytical
methods of detection. Instead it proposed that quantitative risk
assessment be used to define a level of extra cancer risk in a lifetime -
originally, 1 in 100,000,000 or essentially zero.1 6 Several years later,
when FDA replaced a less conservative model with a more protective,
linear dose-response model, it relaxed the negligible risk level from 1 in
1OOM to 1 in 1M. 17 Although FDA's interpretation of the DES
proviso has never been reviewed in the courts, one court ruled that FDA
has general authority under the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (unless
Congress specifically states otherwise) to ignore de minimis risks.18 It
did not define de minimis risk.
In the 1980's, FDA tried to apply the same 1 in 1M standard to
small amounts of carcinogenic color additives. This came to a halt when
a court ruled that Congress, in writing the Delaney Clause, intended to
require zero cancer risk from color additives. 19
Meanwhile, FDA and EPA faced a curious "Delaney Paradox" in
their efforts to register pesticides' If the residues of a carcinogenic
15 Robert J. Scheuplein, SOM and Food Safety Policy, in Safety Evaluation of
Drugs and Chemicals, 405 (W. Eugene Lloyd ed. 1986).
16 U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), Compounds Used in Food
Animals: Proposed Rule, 38 F.R. 19,226 (1973).
17 FDA, Chemical Compounds in Food Producing Animals: Criteria and
Procedures for Evaluating Assays for Carcinogenic Residues in Edible Products of
Animals, 42 F.R. 10,412 (1977).
18 Monsanto Co. v. Kennedy, 613 F.2d 947 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
19 Public Citizen v. Young, 831 F.2d 1108 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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pesticide do not concentrate in processed foods, the permissible
amount of residues on raw and processed foods can be regulated under
a flexible risk-benefit balancing law: the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide
and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA).
FIFRA uses a narrative standard to prevent "unreasonable adverse
effects" from pesticide applications. All pesticides sold in the U.S. must
be registered under FIFRA. Whereas food and drug requirements are
strictly health based, FIFRA defines "unreasonable" in a way that
includes the "economic, social and environmental costs and benefits of
the use of the pesticide."20 This has given the EPA more flexibility.
In effect, FIFRA permits slight amounts of cancer risk from raw
foods if necessary to achieve the benefits to farmers and consumers that
pesticides provide. But if the carcinogenic residues are known to
concentrate in processed foods, then the tolerance level for processed
foods must be set in accordance with the Delaney Clause.
EPA and FDA attempted to evade the Clause by using the 1 in IM
standard as a practical definition of negligible risk for residues on both
raw and processed foods. 2 1 The government was supported in this by
a major recommendation from the National Research Council of the
National Academy of Sciences (NAS-NRC).22 Despite this support,
FDA and EPA lost a major challenge when a Court of Appeals
determined that the de minimis policy was incompatible with the
Delaney Clause.2 3 While the Clause has little scientific and political
support, there is no consensus about how a new law governing pesticide
registration should be written.
Proposals seeking to reform pesticide regulation can be
characterized along a continuum from completely numerical risk-based
standards to a narrative standard that allows full consideration of
pesticide risks and benefits. One proposal would require completely
risk-based registration and reregistrations including a bright line of 1 in
20 FIFRA 5 2(bb), 7 U.S.C. § 136(bb).
21 EPA, Regulation of Pesticides in Food: Addressing the Delaney Paradox: Policy
Statement, 53 F.R. 41,104 (1988).
22 Regulating Pesticides in Food: The Delaney Paradox, (1987).
23 Les v. Reilly, 968 F.2d 985 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 U.S. 1361 (1993).
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1M residual risk in food, without regard to benefits. 24 This health-
based proposal would require risk assessment for specific age categories
using conservative assumptions. On the benefits end of the continuum
is a proposal which would allow EPA to consider the benefits of
pesticides when making registration decisions. This would create a
narrative negligible-risk standard, placing the determination of
negligible risk upon the Administrator of the EPA.25 Greater than a
negligible risk would be allowed if it "provides an adequate, wholesome
and economical food supply." Finally, the Administration proposal
would require conservative assumptions, but does not specify a bright-
line number, instead using a narrative standard of "reasonable certainty
that no harm would occur." 2 6 This does not explicitly phase out
consideration of benefits but would give EPA flexibility in choosing a
risk standard and method of implementation.
Standards to Protect Workers
The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) is
authorized to set workplace standards to provide "safe and healthful
working conditions." 2 7 In 1977 it proposed to regulate carcinogens to
the lowest levels technologically and economically feasible.2 8 When
industry objected, a fierce battle ensued. Ultimately, the U.S. Supreme
Court ruled that OSHA must demonstrate that a risk is "significant"
before adopting a regulation to reduce exposures. In this case, Justice
John Paul Stevens opined that a reasonable person might consider a
lifetime cancer risk of 1 in 1,000 to be significant while a risk of 1 in 1B
could not be so considered. 2 9 However, Justice Stevens was silent on
risks between 1 in 1B and 1 in 1,000, indicating that OSHA had
24 H.R. 4091, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
25 H.R 1627, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
26 H.R 2084 and S. 2050, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
27 OSH Act § 3, 29 U.S.C. § 651 (b).
28 U.S. Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA), Occupational
Exposure to Benzene Emergency Temporary Standards, 42 F.R. 22,516 (1977).
29 Industrial Union Dept. AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607,
655 (1980).
Sadowitz & Graham: Permitted Residual Cancer Risks 25
flexibility to weigh various factors such as the size of the exposed
population, the severity of the adverse affects and the quality of the
scientific evidence. 30 Although OSHA has not articulated a strict
definition of significant risk, it has generally used 1 in 1,000 as a
benchmark of significance. 3 1
Labor groups have been concerned that 1 in 1,000 has been
interpreted by OSHA (and some industry lawyers) as a level of de
minimis rather than significant risk. They would like to grant OSHA
the flexibility to initiate rule making to reduce residual risks in the
range from 1 in 1,000 to 1 in 1M. Now that the Occupational Safety
and Health Act is being rewritten, labor advocates support a bill that
would allow but not require OSHA to regulate any cancer risk greater
than 1 in IM calculated using conservative methods. 3
2
Standards Governing Environmental Exposures
The Supreme Court's 1980 ruling that OSHA must conduct
quantitative risk assessments to support rules caused EPA to consider a
similar approach. As early as 1976, it had published interim guidelines
on how cancer risks from environmental exposures should be
computed. When William Ruckelshaus returned to EPA in 1983 to
restore public confidence, he announced that the principles of risk
assessment and management would govern. Risk assessment practice at
EPA grew rapidly in the 1980's, although none of the environmental
laws administered by EPA mentioned risk assessment explicitly.
In assessing practice at EPA, it is important to remember that FDA
had used the 1 in 1M lifetime cancer risk standard to assure essentially
zero risk for 200M American consumers of meat. Several EPA program
offices have used the 1 in 1M standard quite differently, in some cases
to provide this same degree of protection to a hypothetical, maximally-
30 John D. Graham & March Sadowitz, The Role of Significant Risk in OSHA
Reform, Risk in Perspective, Harvard Center for Risk Analysis, Aug. 1993.
31 OSHA, Occupational Exposure to Ethylene Oxide: Final Standard, 49 F.R.
46,936 (1984); Occupational Exposure to Inorganic Arsenic: Supplemental Statement
of Reasons for the Final Rule, 48 F.R. 1,864 (1983).
32 H.R. 1280, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.(1993).
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exposed individual. The variability in risk-management standards
throughout the federal agencies is interesting, particularly since this
variability is not completely explainable by differences in their
regulatory mandates as prescribed by Congress.
Hazardous Air Pollution
The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 (CAA) require stationary
sources of hazardous air pollutants (including carcinogens) to meet
residual-risk standards after industry has implemented the maximum
achievable control technology. Sources with risks to maximally exposed
individuals are below 1 in 1M do not require residual-risk standards.
Those that do not meet this test are governed by standards that
"protect the public health with an ample margin of safety." 33 This has
been interpreted by EPA, a federal appeals court and Congress to mean
that the most-exposed individual is protected against risks greater than
1 in 10,000 (regardless of feasibility and cost) - and as many citizens
as possible are protected against risks as small as 1 in 1M (taking into
account scientific uncertainty, feasibility and cost considerations). 34
This approach has been used by EPA for benzene and radionuclides. 3 5
Congress will consider revisions to the residual risk standards for air
toxics based on reports prepared by the NAS-NRC and a bipartisan
Commission on Risk Assessment and Management.
Toxic Water Pollution
Under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), better
known as the Clean Water Act, states are required to develop surface
water quality standards that protect public health.3 6 EPA guidance to
33 CAA, § 112, 42 U.S.C. § 7412.
34 Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 838 F.2d 1224 (D.C. Cir. 1987);
Clean Air Act Amendments, Conference Report to Accompany S. 1630, 101st Cong.,
2d Sess., Oct. 26, 1990.
35 EPA, National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants: Benzene
Emissions from Maleic Anhydride Plants, Ethylbenzene/Styrene Plants, Benzene
Storage Vessels, Benzene Equipment Leaks, and Coke by-Product Recovery Plants,
54 F.R. 3,804 (1989); National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants:
Benzene Emissions from Chemical Manufacturing Process Vents, Industrial Solvent
Use, Benzene Waste Operations, Benzene Transfer Operations and Gasoline
Marketing System, 54 F.R. 38,083 (1989).
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the states indicates that carcinogenic risk from each contaminant in
surface water should be reduced into the range from 1 in 100,000 to 1
in 10M, with a preference for 1 in 1M.37 However, some states, such
as Maryland and Virginia, have had water quality standards for dioxin
approved by EPA with acceptable-risk levels in the range from 1 in
10,000 to 1 in 100,000. EPA's decision to approve these standards
under the Clean Water Act was approved by the federal courts. 3 8
Beginning in 1990, EPA has promulgated ambient water quality criteria
for those states which did not have their own water quality criteria at a
lifetime risk level of 1 in 1M.39
Health Standards for Drinking Water
The Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA), last amended in 1986 and
under current debate, requires EPA to set two types of standards for
drinking water. First, nonenforceable "maximum contaminant level
goals" (MCLGs) are levels at which no adverse human health effects are
anticipated while enforceable "maximum contaminant levels" (MCLs)
are to be set as close to MCLGs as is "feasible with the use of best
available technology." 4 0 For carcinogens, MCLGs are typically set at
zero and thus the real basis for regulation under the SDWA is
technological feasibility. The MCLs, although not based on risk
assessment, are very important because they are imported for use in
other environmental laws such as Superfund. Proposed amendments to
the Safe Drinking Water Act would specifically allow EPA to use risk
assessment and incremental cost-benefit analysis when setting levels for
new contaminants.4 1
Hazardous Waste Management
Risk assessment and management is used in the regulation of
36 FWPCA § 303(c), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c).
37 EPA, Water Quality Criteria Availability of Document, 49 F.R. 5,831 (1984).
38 Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 806 F.Supp. 1263, (E.D. Va. 1993).
39 EPA, State Compliance with Clean Water Act Requirements for Adoption of
Water Quality Criteria for Toxic Pollutants, 55 F.R. 14,351 (1990).
40 SDWA § 1412g-1(b)(5), 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)(4).
41 H.R. 3392, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
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hazardous wastes at both abandoned sites and active, permitted waste-
management facilities. There are, however, subtle differences in the risk
management approach at abandoned sites versus active facilities.
Superfund
The Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and
Liability Act (CERCLA) or "Superfund" requires selection of cleanup
strategies which "protect human health and the environment." 42 Risk
assessment plays a dual role in the implementation of the Superfund
Program. A baseline risk assessment conducted at the site determines
whether cleanup is required but risk assessment also may be used to set
site-specific cleanup standards at a site. EPA's risk management policy
for Superfund has been evolving since the passage of the original statute
in 1980. The implementing regulations at first proposed a risk range of
1 in 100,000 to 1 in 10M. Now the National Contingency Plan has
designated an acceptable risk range of I in 10,000 to 1 in 1M.4 3
This "range-of-risk" approach gives site managers flexibility to
choose whether or not to remediate when site risks fall within the range.
In 1991 the Agency published a policy directive stating that risks within
the risk range should not be remediated without adequate
justification. 4 4 The risk-management standards in the Superfund
program have contributed to extensive debate about the cost of cleanup
at hazardous waste sites. The guidelines for Superfund risk assessments
have evolved with the risk-management policy and have been
formalized in the Risk Assessment Guidance for Superflmd.45
CERCLA is now up for reauthorization, and the use of risk
assessment in setting an acceptable level of risk has become a focus of
debate. Novel state policies have sprung out of the debate, such as the
42 CERCLA § 121(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9621(b).
43 EPA, National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, 55
F.R. 8,715 (1988).
44 EPA, Role of the Baseline Risk Assessment in Superfund Remedy Decisions,
Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response (1991).
45 EPA, Risk Assessment Guidance for Superfund, Volume 1, Human Health
Evaluation Manual, (Part A): Interim Final, Office of Emergency and Remedial
Response, Dec. 1989.
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New Jersey law we discuss below, that attempt to return contaminated
industrial properties to use and set different standards for residential
and industrial land use.
The Administration's proposal for Superfund reauthorization does
not include a numerical risk standard but requires that chosen remedial
actions protect human health and the environment. 4 6 This would
require EPA to establish a formula to yield permissible concentration
levels that reflect reasonably anticipated land uses. The cleanup levels
would represent concentrations below which action is not required.
Some site-specific variables will be used in applying these generic
standards. For contaminants that do not have generic standards set, or
if unusual site characteristics exist, parties may petition for a site-
specific risk assessment. This is likely to downplay the use of site-
specific risk assessment. In response to accusations that Superfund risk
assessments are extremely conservative, EPA would be required under
the Clinton plan to promulgate a national risk protocol for conducting
risk assessment based on realistic assumptions.
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) requires
hazardous waste management practices to be protective of human
health and the environment.47 EPA regulates hazardous wastes and the
cleanup of currently active industrial facilities which hold RCRA
permits. Classification of a chemical as "hazardous" is determined
either by maximum contaminant levels set by EPA under the Safe
Drinking Water Act or by use of risk assessment if no MCLs are
available. If the lifetime risk associated with the leaching of wastes is
more than 1 in 100,000, the wastes are classified as hazardous. 4 8
Standards for delisting wastes as hazardous are stricter, requiring a level
of risk below 1 in IM.
46 H.R. 3800, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
47 RCRA § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 6902 (a).
48 EPA, Hazardous Waste Management System; Identification and Listing of
Hazardous Waste; Toxicity Characteristics Revision, 55 F.R. 11,813 (1990).
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Corrective action at active sites is triggered by a risk assessment as
well. Current EPA regulation requires the study of cleanup options if
the risk is greater than 1 in iM, calculated in a specific manner.
However, the cleanup options selected must bring risk within an
acceptable risk range of I in 10,000 to 1 in 1M.49
Residual Cancer Risks Permitted by U.S. Environmental Standards
Policy Law and Language Regulatory Approach
Hazardous Air CAA: an ample margin of safety 1 in 10,000 individual
Pollution and 1 in 1M for
the most people possible
Toxic Water FWPCA: to protect public health 1 in 10,000 to 1 in 10M
Pollution and welfare
Drinking water SDWA: MCLGs within 0
contaminant levels an adequate margin of safety
Superfund CERCLA protection of human 1 in 10,000 to 1 in
health and the environment IM
Hazardous waste RCRAprotective of human health listing: 1 in 100,000
management and the environment corrective action: 1 in
10,000 to 1 in 1M
incinerators: 1 in 100,000,
group C, to 1 in IM
groups A and B
carcinogens
Risk assessment and management practices under RCRA are far
from consistent, despite a unifying statute and implementation by one
agency through one office, the Office of Solid Waste. When setting
standards for waste incineration, industrial boilers and furnaces, EPA
makes a distinction between carcinogen classifications. Group A and B
carcinogens are to be regulated to a risk level of 1 in 1M, while group C
to 1 in 100,000. In addition, for carcinogenic metals, the limit is
established at an aggregate lifetime risk of 1 in 100,000.50
49 EPA, Corrective Action for Solid Waste Management Units (SWMUs) at
Hazardous Waste Management Facilities: Proposed Rule, 55 F.R. 30,800 (1990).
50 EPA, Standards for Owners and Operators of Hazardous Waste Incinerators and
Burning of Hazardous Wastes in Boilers and Industrial Furnaces, 55 F.R. 17,862
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The States Enact Their Own Laws and Standards
Beginning in the 1980's, many states became disgruntled with the
federal government's slow and fragmented approach to environmental
protection. Hence, state legislatures and agencies began to adopt their
own standards, which were frequently different from those enforced by
the federal government.
New Jersey's Hazardous Site Remediation Act
The use of a numerical risk level in the Clean Air Act Amendments
of 1990 was not just a historical fluke. In 1993 the state of New Jersey
passed an act regulating contaminated sites that contains a numerical
risk level. The Hazardous Site Remediation Act attempts to answer the
"how clean is clean" question by requiring that separate remediation
standards be developed for residential and nonresidential property.
The New Jersey law requires the State Department of
Environmental Protection and Energy to adopt minimum remediation
standards for soil, groundwater and surface water such that "the
potential harm to public health and safety and to the environment is
minimized to acceptable levels." 5 1 This section requires the
department to use "reasonable" exposure assumptions and to "avoid the
use of redundant conservative assumptions." The Department is
required to set "minimum remediation standards for both residential
and non-residential uses that will result in an additional cancer risk of 1
in 1,000,000."52 It is unusual for a state to specify risk standards in
statutes. New Jersey has, however, issued such risk standards before,
requiring the state agency in charge of drinking water standards to set
maximum contaminant levels at risk levels of 1 in 1M.53
Michigan Air Pollution Laws
The state of Michigan uses a narrative health standard to regulate
air contaminants which are not already regulated by EPA. Air pollution
is defined as air contaminants which are "injurious to human health or
(1990).
51 NJ. Stat. Ann. Tit. 58, Ch. 10B, § 12(a).
52 Id. § 12(d).
53 N.J. Stat. Ann., Tit. 58, Ch. 12A, § 13(b).
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welfare, or that interfere with the enjoyment of life and properties." 54
The state Air Pollution Control Commission is charged with
establishing ambient air and emission standards. The Commission has
done so by setting standards for new and modified sources.
The maximum allowable emission rate cannot be in excess of the
initial risk screening level of 1 in 1M. Carcinogens may be exempt from
the initial risk screening level if the ambient impact would be less than
the secondary risk screening level of 1 in 100,000. 55 The Michigan Air
Pollution Control Rules prescribe the use of the linearized multistagef
model for cancer risk assessment and even specify the statistical
procedure to be used in determining whether a potency estimate is
based on a good fit to the data.
California's Proposition 65 and Toxic Hot Spots Law
The state that has been most aggressive in requiring risk assessment
is California. California's Proposition 65, the Safe Drinking Water and
Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986, passed as a ballot initiative. It requires
the Department of Health Services to establish a program which is
"more protective of public health than the minimum federal
requirements" by promulgating primary and secondary drinking water
standards. The Department set levels for "no significant risk" in
regulation. The burden is upon the regulated community to prove that
a release will pose "no significant risk" or, in this case, a risk of less than
1 in 100,000.56 Exceptions to 1 in 100,000 can be made to address
competing public health risks such as in the use of chlorine disinfection
to eliminate bacteria. Economic affects and technological feasibility are
not of consideration when setting standards.
A list is compiled by the Department of all human carcinogens and
reproductive toxics on which there is scientific consensus. The list has
been criticized for regulating unused substances or ones used, e.g., for
medical research. 57 California's focus on reproductive toxins appears
54 Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 336.
55 Mich. Admin.Code, r.336 § 1231.
56 Cal. Health & Safety Code, D. 20, Part 1, Ch. 7 § 12,703.
57 William S. Pease, Identifying Chemical Hazards for Regulation: The Scientific
Sadowitz & Graham: Permitted Residual Cancer Risks 33
to be unique and has thus served as a source of hazard identification for
other regulatory bodies.
The California Toxic Hot Spots Law requires industrial facilities to
inventory air emissions of designated chemicals under normal operating
conditions and to report the emissions to the local air pollution control
district.5 8 Facilities with emissions deemed by the local districts to
pose a significant risk are required to inform the exposed communities.
A proposed rule of the South Coast Air Quality Management
Commission would deem a 1 in 100,000 cancer risk as significant. 59
Facilities have five years to reduce total plant emissions to below the
significant risk and action risk levels or face a fine. If the cost would
make the facility unable to continue operating or if the cost per cancer
averted is over $6M, the operator could defer the requirement.6 0
Conclusion
Both the federal and state legislatures and agencies have defined
negligible, acceptable, significant or de minimis risk differently. Levels
from 1 in 100 to 1 in 100M have regulatory importance in various
contexts. Even when risks are managed through similar numerical
definitions, the assumptions about toxicity and exposure used in the
risk assessment process may differ under individual statutory and
regulatory requirements. Some laws and regulations contain rigid
requirements for the risk assessment process and others do not. In some
programs, risk assessors may have wider latitude than in others, making
simple numerical comparisons difficult.
The curious feature of current health, safety and environmental
policy is that actors in the standard-setting process often invoke phrases
such as significant or negligible risk without any shared numerical
Basis and Regulatory Scope of California's Propositions 65 List of Carcinogens and
Reproductive Toxicants, 3 Risk 127, 154 (1992).
58 Cal. Health & Safety Code, D. 26, Part 6, Ch. 3 § 44,340.
59 California Air Pollution Control Officers Association, Air Toxics "Hot Spots"
Program Risk Assessment Guidelines, Jan. 1991.
60 South Coast Air Quality Management Commission, Proposed Rule 1042, Dec.
1993.
6 Riskl Health, Safety & Environment 17 [Winter 1995]
understanding of what the words mean. Indeed, our central finding is
that the current approach to allowing residual cancer risks does not
reflect any coherent or uniform process of risk assessment and
management. Levels of cancer risk that are considered significant (or
negligible) in one federal or state program would not necessarily be
considered significant (or negligible) in another program. It should not
be assumed that such inconsistencies are compelled by legislators in the
statutes that govern risk-management decisions. 6 1 In most cases U.S.
statutes provide only narrative guidance to agencies, which gives risk
managers broad flexibility to define numerical definitions of significant
or negligible risk. Only in rare instances has Congress expressly stated a
required risk level (e.g. the Delaney Clause requirement of zero risk) or
has court stepped in to constrain the way risks are handled by federal
agencies (e.g., the Supreme Court's 1980 benzene decision involving
OSHA). Risk management practices have evolved to reflect the
strength of particular personalities and the power of bureaucratic factors
at least as much as legislative direction.
The more subtle message is that the search for a uniform numerical
determination of significant or negligible cancer risk is unrealistic. If the
magnitude of cancer risk to an exposed individual, were the only
relevant factor in making a decision, then a uniform and numerical risk-
management standard would be sensible. America's apparent confusion
about allowable cancer risks reflects the reality that numerous factors
are considered on a case-by-case basis when making risk-management
decisions. Such case-specific factors may include the number of citizens
exposed to the risk, the demographic and ethnic traits of the citizens at
risk, the degree of public concern about the risk - and the
controllability, affordability and cost-effectiveness of risk management.
While risk-based policy has not achieved a coherent, explicit and
rigorous consideration of these various factors, any process that seeks to
sidestep a careful evaluation of numerous factors appears unlikely to
survive political challenges in the long-run. 62
61 Alon Rosenthal, George M. Gray & John D. Graham, Legislating Acceptable
Cancer Risk from Exposure to Toxic Chemicals, 19 Ecol. L.Q. 324 (1992).
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The use of cancer risk assessment and management by federal and
state agencies is coming under increasing scrutiny by the public.
Legislators are beginning to understand that risk assessment and
management practices are critical in determining how much protection
against risk is provided to the public and what the costs of the
protection are likely to be in the public and private sectors of the
economy. Recently, legislative bodies at the federal and state levels have
begun 'to debate and create statutory policy which deals specifically
with risk assessment and management. Today a major piece of
environmental legislation cannot be considered by the U.S. Congress
without a vigorous debate about both how risks will be calculated and
how much protection will be considered sufficient.
The admittedly chaotic approach to cancer risk management in the
U.S. reflects the reality that no single risk number is likely to be judged
as significant or negligible in all circumstances. A numerical risk level
that seems protective yet reasonable in one decision context may seem
draconian or dangerously permissive in another context. There are
numerous factors relevant to a risk-management decision other than the
level of risk. Such factors include the weight of the scientific evidence
about risk, the number of citizens at risk, the demographic and ethnic
mix of the exposed population, the severity of the adverse health effect,
the degree of public concern about the risk, and the feasibility,
affordability and cost-effectiveness of risk management.
62 John D. Graham, Laura Green & Marc J. Roberts, In Search of Safety. Chemicals
and Cancer Risk, (1988).
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